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ABSTRACT
An Analysis of Wealth Effect to Shareholders of the 
Lodging Industry in Mergers and Acquisitions
by
Sung-Hwan Kim
Dr . Skip Swerdlow, Examination Chair 
Professor of Hotel Administration 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
This study originated from the question of whether 
additional wealth gains from merger and acquisition 
activities accrued to shareholders of both acquiring and 
target hotel firms since there is no enough evidence 
related to the hospitality industry.
The result indicated that corporate takeovers generate, 
on average, significant positive additional gains to 
shareholders of acquiring firms of non-casino hotel firms 
and shareholders of target firms of both non-casino and 
casino hotel firms. Shareholders of acquiring firms of non­
casino hotel firms, on the other hand, earn "normal"
111
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returns from the takeover proposals. Furthermore, the 
results showed .hat there is a difference in the size of 
additional gains between acquiring firms of non-casino 
hotel and casino hotel firms, and that there is a 
difference in size of additional gains between target firms 
of non-casino hotel and casino hotel firms.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
Mergers and acquisitions are currently a popular form 
of corporate expansion and growth. Mergers and acquisitions 
are popular because they can be used to access to 
additional human and physical resources, increase a 
company’s brand awareness, consolidate wealth, enhance 
profit making opportunities and consolidate power to make 
further profits possible. The objective of a merger and an 
acquisition is to obtain control of the human and physical 
resources of the target firm and to utilize these resources 
to maximize the shareholders' wealth through a merger and 
an acquisition aimed at creating sustainable competitive 
advantages for the acquirer.
Since in the hospitality industry markets have become 
saturated, making new construction unfeasible in many 
locations, hospitality firms are increasingly turning to 
mergers and acquisitions as a means to sustain growth. 
According to Cook Jr. (1997), as valuations for lodging
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companies are relatively high and capital availability is 
strong, corporate mergers and acquisitions have been an 
effective mechanism for improving a company's profile and 
achieving growth quickly. This activity is expected to 
continue in the future.
From the early 1990s, the lodging industry has used 
the mergers and acquisitions as an effective mechanism for 
corporate expansion and growth. Table 1 provides a summary 
of merger and acquisition activities between 1992 and 1999 
by hotel and casino industry. Table 1 shows that after 1995 
the value of merger and acquisition deals has dramatically 
increased as well as the number of the deals. Especially, 
in 1997 there were 220 merger and acquisition deals 
collectively valued more than $ 26.67 billion and in 1998 
there were 189 merger and acquisition deals collectively 
valued more than $ 34.85 billion.
Numerous studies have been conducted to investigate 
whether additional wealth gains from mergers and 
acquisitions accrued to the shareholders. Many studies have 
reached three often conflicting conclusions: 1) target 
shareholders earn significantly positive abnormal returns 
from all acquisitions, and 2) acquiring shareholders earn 
negative abnormal return from mergers, and 3) acquiring
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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shareholders earn little or no abnormal returns from tender 
offers (Dodd and Ruback, 1977; Kummer and Hoffmeister,
1978; Dodd, 1980; Asquith, 1983 ; Bradley, Desai, and Kim, 
1983; Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Malatesta, 1983 ; Loughran 
and Vijh, 1997) .
Several other studies (Wansley, Lane, and Yang, 1987; 
Travlos, 1987 ; Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins, 1987; Servqes, 
1991; Peterson and Peterson, 1991) have been conducted to 
determine the impact on bidding firms ' stock returns 
depending on the choice of method of payment for mergers 
and acquisitions. They found negative abnormal returns in 
stock offers and no abnormal returns in cash offers. On the 
other hand, some other studies (Wruck, 1989 ; Hertzel and 
Smith, 1993; Chang, 1998) found no abnormal returns in cash 
offers but positive abnormal returns in stock offers.
Most previous studies focused on multiple industries 
or single non-hospitality industry as the sample. The 
lodging industry is, however, substantially different from 
many other non-lodging industries due to high stock 
volatility, strong capital availability and fixed asset­
intensive. This study, based on the market model 
(Fama,1969) utilizes empirical evidence of both acquiring 
and target firms of non-casino and casino hotels as to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
investigate whether shareholders in the lodging industry 
gain additional wealth from mergers and acquisitions.
Table 1.
Merger and Acquisition Activities by Hotel and Casino
Industry from 1992 to 1999.
Year Value of Deals ($million)
The Number of 
Deals
1992 748 .5 22
1993 2,081.1 44
1994 2,701.4 80
1995 4,598.1 93
1996 11,104.2 166
1997 26,679.0 220
1998 34,850.0 189
1999 13,504.0 87
Note : The data was obtained from each year's Mergers & 
Acquisitions from 1992 - 1999.
The Statement of the Problem 
The previous empirical studies that investigated the 
shareholder wealth effects have found that shareholders 
gain positive additional wealth as a result of mergers and 
acquisitions. There is enough evidence, however, to suggest 
that the wealth effects of acquisitions are not homogeneous
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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across all transactions, and the different wealth effects 
are the results of different factors that are unique to the 
transaction (Kwansa, 1994). This study will focus on non­
casino hotels and casino hotels with the intention of 
providing empirical evidence as to whether shareholders in 
the lodging industry earn significant additional wealth as 
a result of mergers and acquisitions. Therefore, the 
questions raised for answer in this study are:
1. Do the shareholders of acquiring firms earn
significant additional wealth created in the 
event of a takeover?
2. Do the shareholders of target firms earn
significant additional wealth created in the 
event of a takeover?
3. Is there any significant difference between
the size of abnormal returns to acquiring 
firms of non-casino hotels compared to the 
size of abnormal returns to acquiring firms of 
casino hotels?
4. Is there any significant difference between
the size of abnormal returns to target firms 
of non-casino hotels compared to the size of 
abnormal returns to target firms of casino 
hotels?
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Justification of the Study
Previous empirical studies that investigated the size 
shareholder wealth effects have concentrated on multiple 
industries or single non-hospitality industry that have 
large asset values, expect for the study conducted by 
Kwansa (1994). Kwansa utilized hotel and restaurant firms 
as a sample and examined the size of shareholder wealth 
accruing to shareholders. In comparison, this study focuses 
on non-casino hotels and casino hotels and provides 
empirical evidence to investigate the size of shareholder 
wealth accruing to shareholders in the non-casino and 
casino hotel firms.
The lodging industry is different from other 
manufacturing industry because of high rate of real estate 
assets and intangible assets such as management intensive 
and franchise affiliation. Ambrose (1990) examined 
relationship between real estate assets and corporate 
takeover probability and showed that real estate asset is 
an important factor in the corporate takeover. Also, 
previous studies indicated that the valuation of real 
estate stock is significantly different from the valuation 
of common stock (Fogler, 1984; Firstenberg, Ross, and 
Zisler, 1988; Kaplin and Schwarz, 1988). The additional 
shareholder wealth created for lodging firms, therefore.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
7
will be different from the shareholder wealth created for 
non-lodging firms.
Empirical studies in the area of shareholder wealth 
effects of takeover assume that stocks of firms within the 
same industry are homogeneous. Schmalensee (1985), however, 
investigated industry effects and found that industry 
effects exist and are important. Kwansa (1994) also found 
that the size of shareholder wealth gains between hotel and 
restaurant industry is significantly different. These 
findings suggest that stocks of non-casino hotel and casino 
hotel firms are heterogeneous and valuation of its sector's 
stock will be different because of different market 
reaction to a certain event. As a result, the size of 
shareholder wealth gains from takeover proposal between two 
groups is different because of its own characteristics and 
unique business environment such as higher barriers for 
entering into the casino industry.
This study attempts the first to investigate the size 
of the shareholders wealth effects for the acquiring firms 
in the lodging industry. Moreover, this study is the first 
attempt focusing on casino hotel firms. This study 
introduces and attempts to answer the unanswered question 
of whether shareholder of both acquiring and target firms 
in the lodging industry earn significant additional wealth
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
effects as a result of the proposals of the mergers and
8
acquisitions.
Research Hypotheses
Based on the statement of the problems mentioned 
previously, the hypotheses of this study originated from 
the unanswered question of whether the shareholders of each 
acquiring and target firms of non-casino and casino hotels 
earn significant positive additional gain as a result of 
the proposals of mergers and acquisitions. The rejection of 
the null hypothesis will imply that shareholders of each 
acquiring and target firms of non-casino and casino hotels 
experience significant positive wealth effects as a result 
of the proposals of mergers and acquisitions.
Null Hypothesis 1:
There is no significant difference in the size of 
additional shareholder wealth gained by shareholders of 
acquiring firms in the event of a takeover.
Null Hypothesis 2:
There is no significant difference in the size of 
additional shareholder wealth gained by shareholders of 
target firms in the event of a takeover.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Null Hypothesis 3 :
There is no significant difference between the size of 
abnormal returns to acquiring firms of non-casino hotels 
compared to the size of abnormal returns to acquiring firms 
of casino hotels.
Null Hypothesis 4:
There is no significant difference between the size of 
abnormal returns to target firms of non-casino hotels 
compared to the size of abnormal returns to target firms of 
casino hotels.
Delimitation of the Study
The scope of this study is delimited as follow:
1. The casino hotel is defined as a hotel whose 
primary source of revenue is gaming and where lodging 
accommodations are provided. The non-casino hotel is 
defined as a hotel whose primary source of revenue is 
lodging accommodations.
2. This study focuses only on the lodging industry, 
non-casino hotels and casino hotels. The additional 
shareholder wealth of other hospitality sectors, such as 
the restaurant sector is excluded from the study due to 
different capital structure and assets structure.
Valuation of real estate assets for the lodging industry is
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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different from the valuation of financial assets in other 
hospitality sectors.
3. This study focuses on both target and acquiring 
firms that are publicly owned. The additional shareholder 
wealth of privately held firms is excluded from the study 
because of poor information availability.
Limitations of the Study
This study will have the following limitations :
1. The samples used in the study are limited to the 
lodging firms (casino hotels and non-casino hotels) for 
which have to be publicly traded, listed on the New York 
Stock Exchange and the American Stock Exchange (NYSE/AMEX) 
and the National Association of Securities Dealers 
Automated Quotation System (NASDAQ) over the period from 
1990 through 1999, and for which daily stock returns were 
on the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) tape 
because the data is available in readily usable form.
2. The impacts of special corporate events, such as 
announcement of dividend increase and major management or 
financial reorganization, are not considered in the study 
due to elimination of other side effects.
3. This study only considers merger and acquisition 
activities from 1990 to 1999.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Definition of Terms
1. Abnormal returns (or residuals): The term The 
abnormal returns (or residuals) is defined as the 
difference between the stock return at any time and the 
predicted stock return.
2. Acquiring firm: A firm that has made an offer to 
take over another firm.
3. Acquisition: An activity that one firm purchases 
the assets or shares of another firm, and the acquired 
firm's shareholders ceases to be owners of that firm. The 
words merger and acquisition are often treated synonymously.
4. Casino hotel : A hotel whose primary source of 
revenue is casino gaming including table games and slot 
machines, where lodging accommodations are provided.
5. Cumulative abnormal return (CAR): The sum of 
differences between the expected return on a stock and the 
actual return that comes from the release of new 
information to the financial market.
6. Event study: A statistical study that examines how 
the release of information affects prices at a particular 
time. Event studies in finance measure stock performance 
after subtracting a benchmark return based on beta risk
7. Merger: An agreement to combine two or more 
corporations to form one economic unit under procedures
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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established by the state of incorporation of each 
corporation (Kuhn, 1990) .
8. Market model : A one-factor model for returns where 
the index that is used for factor is an index of the 
returns on the whole market. The market returns are 
considered to reflect the effects of all the underlying 
factors that affect in the market. (Kwansa, 1994)
9. Non-casino hotel: A hotel whose primary source of 
revenue is lodging accommodation without casino facilities.
10. Spin-off : A form of corporate restructuring in 
which a parent firm becomes smaller. In spin-off the 
business unit is not sold for cash or securities. Rather 
common stock in the unit is distributed to the shareholders 
of the company on a pro rata basis, after which the 
operation becomes a completely separate company with its 
own traded stock. (Van Horne, 1998)
11. Takeover : General term referring to transfer of 
control of a firm from one group of shareholders. A 
takeover is similar to an acquisition and also implies that 
the acquirer is much larger than the acquired.
12. Target firm: A firm that is the object of a 
takeover by another firm.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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13. Tender offer: An offer to purchase or exchange 
shares of stock of another company at a fixed price per 
share from stockholders who tender their share.
14. The Center for Research in Security Price (CRSP) 
Files : CRSP provides monthly, quarterly, or annual updates 
of end-of-day and month-end prices on all listed on the New 
York Stock Exchange and the American Stock Exchange 
(NYSE/AMEX) and the National Association of Securities 
Dealers Automated Quotation System (NASDAQ) common stocks 
with the basic market indices.
15. The event day (or the announcement day): It is the 
day that the announcement of an acquisition proposal is 
appeared on the Wall Street Journal or day after the 
announcement appears on the Dow Jones newswire.
Organization of the Study
This study is designed to investigate whether 
shareholders in the lodging industry earn significant 
additional wealth as a result of mergers and acquisitions. 
Chapter 2 provides a review of previous literature on the 
shareholder wealth effects of mergers and acquisitions. 
Chapter 3 is a description of the sampling and data 
collection procedures and the research methodology employed 
in this study. Chapter 4 reports the findings of the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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empirical investigation and analyzes the results. Finally 
chapter 5 summarizes the results of the tests, and the 
conclusion. Suggestions for future research are also 
presented.
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CHAPTER 2 
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
Introduction
Previous empirical studies have found shareholders, on 
average, gain positive additional wealth from acquisitions. 
The wealth effects of acquisitions, however, are not 
homogeneous across all transactions and the different 
wealth effects are created by different unique transaction 
factors. Most empirical studies have focused on industries 
other than the hospitality industry, which has special 
characteristics, such as being intangible/fixed asset 
intensive and labor/service oriented. Moreover, there is 
little hospitality literature related to this study. 
Therefore, a study of the wealth effects of acquisitions in 
the hospitality industry appears to be needed.
15
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Shareholder Wealth Effects on 
Mergers and Acquisitions 
The impact of takeovers on shareholder wealth has been 
a constant issue of debate in financial economics. The 
empirical evidence indicates that the shareholders of 
target firms receive positive economic gains from takeovers 
The premiums of the shareholders of target companies from 
takeovers have historically exceeded 3 0 percent on average, 
and in recent times have averaged about 50 percent (Jensen,
1994). Mergerstat Review (1992) showed that the average 
premium above market price during the period 1983 through 
1992 ranged between 31.5 percent and 40 percent.
The benefit for the shareholders of acqpairing 
companies, however, is ambiguous. A comprehensive review of 
empirical evidence has showed that acquiring firms earn 
either statistically significant negative abnormal returns 
indicating that the shareholders of acquiring firms 
experienced significant loss as a result of the takeover 
proposals (Dodd, 1980; Firth, 1980; Eger, 1983 ; Jarrell and 
Poulsen, 1989; Raad, Ryan, and Sinkey, 1999), or 
insignificant positive abnormal returns (Asquith, 1983 ; 
Eckho, 1983; Dennis and McConnell, 1986; Ami hud, Dodd, and 
Weinstein, 1986) around the announcement of the merger
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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proposal. Other studies on tender offers, on the other hand, 
have reported that the shareholders of the acquiring firms 
gain small significant positive abnormal returns indicating 
that the shareholders of the acquiring firms earn 
significant additional gain as a result of the takeover 
proposals (Mandelker, 1974; Dodd and Ruback, 1977 ; Bradley, 
1980; Bradley et al., 1983; Walker, 2000) . These mixed 
empirical findings, therefore, make it difficult to 
interpret evidence and draw conclusions regarding the 
impact of takeover on the shareholders of acquiring firms.
There are two classes of acquisitions theories on 
shareholder wealth effects (Halpern, 1983). The first 
theory is the non-value maximizing theory or zero-impact 
theory, that neither the acquiring nor the target company 
receives economic gains as a result of an acquisition. Any 
positive gains obtained by the target shareholders as an 
inducement would be offset by a loss to the acquiring firm 
shareholders (Halpern, 1983). That is, the shareholders of 
the target firms would be expected to have positive 
abnormal returns either at the first public announcement of 
the acquisitions or at the effective date of the 
acquisitions. The shareholders of the acquiring firms would
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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be expected to have negative abnormal returns over the 
entire period.
The second theory is the value maximization or 
positive impact theory that the shareholders of both target 
and acquiring firms would be expected to have positive 
economic gains from the acquisitions. This theory is 
supported by three hypotheses : monopoly rent, synergy, and 
internal efficiency (Kwansa, 1994).
The first hypothesis is that takeovers result in 
monopoly market power and that monopoly rents are generated 
(Ellert, 1976). If monopolistic market power is increased 
through a takeover, all companies in the industry should 
benefit as the price of products that the industry produces 
is increased. The empirical implication, however, is that 
the target and/or bidding firm shareholders benefit from a 
takeover, but the hypothesis provides no prediction as to 
how the monopoly rents are split to the target and/or 
bidding firms (Dodd and Ruback, 1977).
The second hypothesis is that there is a difference 
between the combined value of the target and acquiring 
firms from a takeover and the sum of the value of each 
dependent firm. According to Bradley et al. (1983), the 
value created by the combination may result from more
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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efficient management, economies of scale, improved 
production techniques, the combination of complementary 
resources, the redeployment of assets to more profitable 
uses, the exploitation of market power, or any number of 
value-created mechanisms that fall under the general rubric 
of corporate synergy. The implication of the synergy 
hypothesis is that successful takeovers generate gains to 
the firms and unsuccessful offers generate zero or negative 
gains to the firms.
Finally, the internal efficiency hypothesis indicates 
that the value of firms can be increased through a change 
in management. Jensen and Ruback (1983) stated that a 
takeover generally occurs because changes in technology or 
market conditions require a major restructuring of 
corporate assets. That is, an acquiring firm is assumed to 
be motivated by information about a target firm's 
management inefficiency. The announcement of a takeover is 
considered to be positive information for the target firm, 
and the financial market in turn responds favorably by 
increasing the market value of both the target and the 
acquiring firm.
The hypotheses reviewed in this section appear to be 
reasonable explanations of takeover activity. This study
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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will investigate whether zero-impact theory or the positive 
impact theory is identified as a result of takeover 
proposals.
Previous Empirical Studies on the 
Shareholder Wealth Effect 
To measure the impact of mergers and acquisitions, 
numerous studies have been conducted to determine whether 
shareholders of both target and acquiring firms gain 
positive abnormal returns accrued from the events. Dodd and 
Ruback (1977) used the market model to investigate the 
impact of tender offers on the returns to shareholders of 
both target and bidding firms. Using monthly return data of 
172 bidding firms (124 of successful and 48 of unsuccessful 
tender offers) and 172 target firms (13 6 successful and 3 6 
unsuccessful tender offers), they found that target 
shareholders of successful tender offers earned 20.58 
percent while those of unsuccessful tender offers earned 
18.96 percent abnormal returns. Shareholders of bidding 
firms in successful and unsuccessful tender offers, on the 
other hand, gained 2.83 percent and 0.58 percent abnormal 
retuzms, respectively. Dodd and Ruback, therefore, rejected 
the zero impact hypothesis implying that bidding firms had
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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no positive economic gains from takeovers, and accepted the 
positive impact hypothesis. That is, the shareholders of 
both the target and bidding firms eairn positive economic 
gains.
Asquith et al. (1983) also examined the effect of 
mergers on shareholders of bidding firms using a sample of 
428 bids from 1963 through 1979. They found that the sample 
firms earned 2.8 percent average cumulative excess returns 
with a t-statistic of 5.2. Furthermore, after controlling 
for the target's size, for the outcome of the merger bid, 
and for the time period in which the bid occurred, they 
found even larger excess returns. Based on their results, 
they concluded that mergers provide positive cumulative 
abnormal returns for the shareholders of bidding firms.
In a study investigating strategic objectives and 
stock performance of acquiring firms. Walker (2000) used a 
sample of 278 acquisitions covering the period from 1980 
through 1996. The results of the study supported both the 
asymmetric information hypothesis that shareholders of 
acquiring firms experience higher returns following cash 
offers, and the strategic alignment hypothesis that 
shareholders of acquiring firms experience higher returns 
following takeovers that increase their market share or
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expand their operations geographically. Walker also found 
that no competitive gains or strategic advantage over rival 
firms accrue to bidding firms. Walker concluded that the 
use of different payment methods and strategic objectives 
do not guarantee a positive response by the financial 
markets or gains to shareholders of bidding firms
In testing the shareholder wealth effect in the 
hospitality industry, Kwansa (1994) investigated the impact 
of acquisitions on shareholders of hospitality firms.
Before Kwansa's study, most acquisition studies in the 
hospitality industry were descriptive in nature and few 
industry-specific studies had been conducted. Using a 
sample of 39 restaurant and 18 hotel target firms between 
1980 and 1990 and the market model, Kwansa obtained average 
abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns for the 
shareholders of the target restaurant and hotel firms. The 
results of the study indicated that shareholders of both 
target restaurant and hotel firms gained 29.8 percent and 
8.86 percent cumulative abnormal returns over a period of 
3 0 days before and after the announcement of the 
acquisitions, respectively. The evidence also showed a 
significant difference in the size of excess returns 
between the target restaurant and hotel companies. Kwansa
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concluded that the stock market is efficient in valuing 
stocks of hospitality companies. That is, contrary to the 
perception that hospitality firms' stocks are undervalued 
because of real estate factors, stock returns of 
hospitality firms are similar to those of firms in other 
industries.
Other studies offer evidence that acquiring firms 
experience negative abnormal returns or zero/small abnormal 
returns that are not statistically significant. Asquith 
(1983) examined the abnormal stock returns of both 
successful and unsuccessful merger bids in order to 
investigate the effect of merger bids on stock returns.
Both successful and unsuccessful target firms showed, on 
average, significant positive abnormal returns on the 
announcement day and the day before. However, there were 
significant positive abnormal returns to successful target 
firms and significant negative abnormal returns to 
unsuccessful target firms on the outcome date; that is, the 
day that the outcome of a merger bid is reported in The 
Wall Street Journal. Both successful and unsuccessful 
bidding firms, on the other hand, exhibited small positive 
excess returns that were statistically insignificant on the 
announcement day and the day before. On the outcome date.
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both, firms' returns were statistically insignificant.
Asquith concluded that abnormal returns occur throughout 
the period from the press date to the outcome date as new 
information is released, and that the increases in the 
probability of merger should cause the stock, price of both 
acquiring and target firms to adjust in one direction and 
the decreases in the probability of merger should cause 
price of both acquiring and target firms to adjust in the 
opposite direction.
Bradley et al. (1988) conducted an empirical analysis 
of synergistic gains using the revaluation of 23 6 samples 
of tender offers. Daily abnormal returns of both target and 
acquiring firms were obtained by the market model using 
with daily stock returns. The average gain represented a 
7.4 percent increase in the combined wealth accrued to 
shareholders of target and acquiring firms. The authors 
also found that the gains of target shareholders were 
significant and had increased since che William Amendment 
in 1968. Shareholders of acquiring firms, on the other hand, 
experienced positive gain during 1963-1968, but had 
suffered a significant loss during 1981-1984. In addition, 
the authors found that competition among bidding firms 
increased the returns to target firms and decreased the
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returns to bidding firms. Moreover, total abnormal returns 
in multiple-bidder acquisitions were higher. That is, the 
targets of multiple-bidder acquisitions enjoy higher 
abnormal returns not only at the expense of shareholders of 
acquiring firms but from the greater synergistic gains that 
accompany these transactions.
Raad et al., (1999) focused on the joint effects of 
leverage, ownership structure, and relative size on the 
excess returns to both target and acquiring firms. Based on 
a sample of 81 target firms and 81 acquiring firms in 
successful takeovers occurring between 1980 and 1990, they 
found that takeovers provided, on average, positive excess 
returns to target firms and negative excess returns to 
acquiring firms. The results of the study also showed a 
significant positive relationship between the debt ratios 
of target firms and excess returns to shareholders of 
target firms, and a negative relationship between the debt 
ratios of target firms and excess returns to shareholders 
of acquiring firms. In addition, neither the ownership 
structure of target firms nor the size of target firms had 
any significant effect on the gains accruing to 
shareholders of either target or acquiring firms. The 
authors concluded that the capital structure of target
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firms affects the allocation of excess gains between 
targets and acquirers.
In conclusion, based on the previous studies it is 
clear that target firms enjoy substantial economic gains in 
takeovers. However, for acquiring firms, the evidence is 
inconclusive, as the empirical findings make it difficult 
to interpret existing evidence and to draw conclusions.
Also most empirical studies have focused on multiple 
industries or single non-hospitality industry expect for 
the study conducted by Kwansa (1994) who examined the 
impact of acquisitions on the shareholders of hotel and 
restaurant target firms. The literature review, therefore, 
reveals that there are not enough empirical findings 
regarding the impact of acquisitions on the shareholders in 
the lodging industry. Moreover, Kwansa (1994) only 
concentrated on target firms of hotel and restaurant. As a 
result, this study that attempts to investigate whether the 
shareholders of each acquiring and target firms of non­
casino and casino firms earn any additional gains from the 
takeover proposals is needed to provide evidence on this 
matter for the lodging industry.
Jensen and Ruback (1983) reviewed literature on 
corporate takeovers and presented evidence of abnormal
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returns associated with tender offers and mergers, and 
post-outcome abnormal returns associated with tender offers 
and mergers. Tables 2 and 3 provide a summary of literature 
on tender offers and mergers. In addition, Jarrell and 
Poulsen (1987) reported an apparent time dependency in the 
stock market reaction to tender offers between 1962 and 
1986. Table 4 summarizes the excess returns to acquiring 
firms .
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Table 2. 
Abnormal Returns Associated with Mergers and Tender Offers; Sample Size and 
t-statistic are given in Parentheses.
Sample
Period
Bidder Firms Target Firms
Study Event Period Successful
(%)
Unsucce­
ssful (%)
Successful
(%)
Unsucce­
ssful (%)
Panel A.
Dodd & 
Ruback 
(1977)
Tender 
offer ; 
1958-1978
Announcement effects
Offer announcement month 
The month of and month 
following offer 
announcement
+2.83 
(124, 2.16) 
+3.12 
(124, 2.24)
+ 0.58 
(48, 1.19) 
-1.71 
(48, -0.76)
+20.58 
(133, 25.81) 
+21.15 
(133, 15.75)
+18.96 
(36, 12.41) 
+16.31 
(36, 6.32)
Kummer & 
Hoffmeist 
er (1978)
1956-1974 Offer announcement month + 5.20 
(17, 1.96)
n.a. +16.85 
(50, 10.88)
+21.09 
(38, 11.87)
Bradley
(1980)
1962-1977 20 days before through 
20 days after the 
announcement
+4.36 
(88, 2.67)
-2.96 
(46, -1.31)
+32.18 
(161, 26.68)
+47.26 
(97, 30.42)
Jarrell &
Bradley
(1980)
1962-1977 40 days before through 
20 days after the 
announcement
+ 6.66 
(88, 3.35)
n.a. +34.06 
(147, 25.48)
n.a.
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Continued
Sample
Period
Bidder Firms Target Firms
Study Event Period Successful
(%)
Unsucce­
ssful (%)
Successful
{%)
Unsucce­
ssful (%)
Bradley,
Desai,
& Kim 
(1983)
Bradley, 
Desai, & 
Kim 
(1983)
1963-1980
1962-1980
10 days before through 10 
days after the 
announcement
10 days before through 10 
days after the 
announcement
n.a.
+2.35 
(161, 3.02)
-0.27 
(94, 0.24)
n.a.
n.a.
+31.80 
(162, 36.52)
+35.55 
(112, 36.6)
n.a.
Weighted average 
abnormal return
+ 3.81 
(478, n.a.)
-1.11 
(236, n.a.)
+29.09 
(653, n.a.)
+35.17 
(283, n.a.)
Panel B-
Dodd
(1980)
1 Mergers : 
1970-1977
Two-day announcement 
effects
The day before and after 
the announcement
-1.09 
(60, -2.98)
-1.24 
(66, -2.64)
+13.41 
(71, 23.80)
+12.73 
(80, 19.08)
Asquith
(1983)
1962-1976 The day before and after 
the announcement
+ 0.20 
(196, 0.78)
+0.50 
(89, 1.92)
6.20 
(211, 23.07)
+7.00 
(91, 12.83)
Ec)(bo
(1983)
1963-1978 The day before through the 
day after the announcement
+ 0.07 
(102, -0.12)
+ 1.20 
(57, 2.98)
+ 6.24 
(57, 9.97)
+10.20 
(29, 15.22)
Weighted
abnormal
average
return
-0.05 
(358, n.a.)
+ 0.15 
(212, n.a.)
+7.72 
(339, n.a.)
+9.76 
(200, n.a.)
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Sample
Period
Bidder Firms Target Firms
study Event Period Successful Unsucce­ Successful Unsucce­
(%) ssful (%) (%) ssful (%)
Panel B-2 Mergers ; One-month announcement 
effects
Dodd 1970-1977 20 days before through the + 0.80 + 3.13 +21.78 +22.45
(1080) first public announcement 
day
(60, 0.67) (66, 2.05) (71, 11.93) (80, 10.38)
Asquith, 1962-1976 19 days before through the + 0.20
Bruner, & first public announcement (196, 0.26)
Mullins day + 1.20 +13.30 +11.70
(1983) (87, 1.49) (211, 15.65 (91, 6.71)
Malatesta 1969-1974 Public announcement month + 0.90
(1983) (256, 1.53)
n.a. + 16.8 n.a.
Ec)<bo 1963-1978 20 days before through 10 + 1.58 (83, 17.57)
(1983) days after the (102, 1.48)
announcement +4.85 
(57, 3.43)
+14.08 
(57, 6.97)
+25.03 
(29, 12.61)
Weighted average + 1.37 + 2.45 +15.90 +17.24
abnormal return (784, n.a.) (251, n.a.) (457, n.a.) (219, n.a.)
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Bidder Firms Target Firms
Study SamplePeriod Event Period
Successful
(%)
Unsucce­
ssful (%)
Successfu
1
(%)
Unsucce­
ssful (%)
Panel B-3 Mergers: Total abnormal returns 
from the announcement 
through outcome
Dodd
(1080)
1970-1977 10 days before the offer 
announcement through 10 
days after outcome date
-7.22 
(60, -2.50)
-5.50 
(66, -2.05)
+33.96 
(71, 7.66)
+3.68 
(80, 0.96)
Asquith
(1983)
1962-1976 10 days before the offer 
announcement through 
outcome date
-0.10 
(196, -0.05)
-5.90 
(87, -3.15)
+15.50 
(211, 6.01)
-7.50 
(91, -1.54)
Wier
(1983)
1962-1979 10 days prior announcement 
through 10 days after 
cancellation date
+0.90 
(256, 1.53)
n.a. + 16.8 
(83, 17.57)
n.a.
Weighted
abnormal
average
return -1.77 (256, n.a.)
-4.82 
(171, n.a.)
+20.15 
(282, n.a.)
-2.88 
(188, n.a.)
Note; n.a. = not available 
Source; Jensen and Ruback (1983)
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Table 3. 
Summary of Post-Outcome Abnormal Returns for Tender Offers and Mergers 
Sample Size and t-statistic are given in Parentheses.
Sample
Period
Bidder Firms Target Firms
Study Event Period Successful
(%)
Unsucce­
ssful (%)
Successful
(%)
Unsucce­
ssful (%)
Panel A Tender
offer
Dodd & 
Ruback 
(1977)
1968-1978 Month after through 12 
months after the offer 
announcement
-1.32 
(124, -0.41)
-1.60 
(48, -0.52)
+7.95 
(133, 0.85)
-3.25 
(36, 0.90)
Bradley, 
Desai & 
Kim (1983)
1962-1980 Month after through 12 
months after the offer 
announcement
n.a. -7.85 
(94, -2.34)
n.a. +3.04
(112,
0.90)
Panel B Mergers
Mandelker
(1974)
1941-1962 Month after through 12 
months after the 
effective day
+ 0.60 
(241, 0.31)
n.a. n.a.
n.a.
Langetieg
(1978)
1929-1969 Month after through 12 
months after the 
effective day
-6.59 
(149, -2.96)
n.a. n.a.
n.a.
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Sample
Period
Bidder Firms Target Firms
Study Event Period Successful
(%)
Unsucce­
ssful (%)
Successful
(%)
Unsucce­
ssful (%)
Asquith
(1983)
1962-1976 Day after through 240 
days after the outcome 
announcement
-7.20 
(196, -4.10)
-9.60 
(89, -5.41)
n.a. -8.7 
(91, -2.11)
Malatesta
(1983)
1969-1974 Month after through 12 
months after approval for 
entire sample
-2.90 
(121, -1.05)
n.a. n.a. n.a.
Month after through 12 
months after approval for 
mergers occurring after 
1970
13.7 
(75, 2.88)
n.a. n.a. n.a.
Month after through 12 
months after approval for 
firms with equity value 
under $300 million
-7.70 
(.59, 1.52)
n.a.
n.a. n.a.
n.a. = Not Available 
Source: Jensen and Ruback (1983)
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Table 4.
Cumulative Excess Returns to Successful Bidders
for Tender Offers During 1960 to 1985, by Decade.
Trading-day Interval All 1960s 1970s 1980s
-10 to +5 1.14 4 .40 1.22 -1.10
(t stat.) (2.49) (4.02) (2.12) (-1.54)
-10 to +20 2.04 4.95 2.21 -0 .04
(t stat.) (3.31) (3.52) (2.87) (-0.04)
Number of observation 405 106 140 159
Source: Jarrell and Poulsen (1987)
The Market Model and Its Empirical Application 
Most empirical research involving the impact of 
mergers and acquisitions on shareholder returns has used 
the market model. The market model is popular because it 
does not assume that all covariance between stocks is due 
to common covariance with the market, and therefore it does 
not lead to the simple expression of portfolio risk that 
arises under the single-index model (Elton and Gruber,
1995). However, according to Sullivan (1989), the accuracy 
of estimated wealth effects depends on the correctness of 
the assumed return generating model used to estimate these 
wealth effects and the appropriateness of the market 
parameters estimated by the model.
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The response of the financial market to a takeover bid 
can be measured using daily stock return data that show 
abnormal shareholder returns. Such returns measure the 
effect of the new information becoming accessible to the 
public. Therefore, the estimate of the abnormal returns 
created by a takeover is based on the market model 
prediction error when the takeover is announced to the 
public. On the assumption that stock returns are 
distributed in a multi-variate normal manner, the abnormal 
return (prediction error) is estimated by the following 
market model:
where = rate of return of security i over period t, R^^
= rate of return on a value weighted market portfolio over 
period t, and a^, b^ = market model parameter estimates.
The abnormal return (AR^^) to firm i on day t can be
written as:
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The abnormal return for security i is calculated as 
the difference between the actual return of the security 
and the return of its control portfolio. The b^ (slope
coefficient) can be interpreted as a measure of the 
systematic risk of security i and indicates the degree to 
which security i responds to changes in the return provided 
by the overall market. The random disturbance term, is
interpreted as a measure of the abnormal returns to the 
shareholders of firm i for period t. It is an abnormal 
return in the sense that it represents the deviation of the 
return on a security from its expected return, given the 
return earned by the market index during that period (Dodd, 
1980). This disturbance is captured as the economic impact 
of an economic event such as a takeover proposal when a 
firm is exposed by the event. The implication of the market 
model, and especially the disturbance (or residual) term, 
has been the main focus of testing market efficiency 
generally and characteristics of market equilibrium 
specifically (Kwansa, 1994) .
A study done by Fama, Fisher, Jensen, and Roll (1969) 
was the first to use the market model to test the 
adjustment of stock prices to new information about stock
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splits. The authors' residual analysis technique has been 
used in later studies on the effect of takeovers.
Dodd and Ruback (1977) studied the stock market 
reaction to both target and bidding firms involved in 
successful and unsuccessful tender offers. Dodd and Ruback 
used the market model over the pre- and post-event period 
and a sample of 344 tender offers listed on the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) tapes. The event day was 
defined as the first public announcement of a tender offer, 
and the abnormal return was defined as the average 
deviation of the monthly return on securities from their 
normal relationship with the market as depicted by the 
market model. Since evidence was found of positive abnormal 
returns to both target and bidding firms, the authors 
rejected the zero theory. However, the results of the study 
may be biased since Dodd and Ruback excluded 12 months data 
on before and after the event month and the announced month. 
The number of target firms in the original sample, 
therefore, was reduced due to insufficient data.
Bradley et al. (1988) used the market model and daily 
stock return data instead of monthly data to determine 
wealth effects accruing to both target and bidding firms.
The authors found that competition among acquiring firms
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increased the returns to target firms and decreased the 
returns to bidding firms. Moreover, total abnormal returns 
in multiple-bidder acquisitions were higher. That is, the 
targets of multiple-acquirer acquisitions enjoy higher 
abnormal returns not only at the expense of shareholders of 
the acquiring firms, but from the greater synergistic gains 
that accompany these transactions.
In a study related to the hospitality industry, Kwansa 
(1994) investigated the wealth effect created by 
acquisitions in the lodging and restaurant industry, 
focusing on lodging and restaurant companies. With a sample 
of 18 hotel corporations and 3 9 restaurant corporations 
listed on the National Association of Securities Dealers 
Automated Quotation System (NASDAQ) and the New York Stock 
Exchange and the American Stock Exchange (NYSEXAMEX),
Kwansa used the market model and daily stock return data to 
estimate stock returns for target firms covering 3 0 days 
before and after the announcement of the acquisitions. The 
results showed that shareholders of both hotel and 
restaurant target firms experienced significant abnormal 
returns during acquisitions. Kwansa concluded that the 
stock market is efficient in valuing stocks of hospitality 
firms.
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Blackburn et al. also used the market model to 
investigate the relationship between acquiring firm control 
structures and payment method. Abnormal returns were 
calculated by using 255 daily stock returns, ending one 
year before the public announcement of the acquisition. The 
authors estimated abnormal returns using 5 days before the 
offer announcement through the announcement day, and also 
used the standard event study method to specify abnormal 
returns to shareholders attributable to the announcement of 
acquisitions. The results supported the notion that a 
disparate outcome of mergers cannot be determined without 
consideration of the corporate control structure and the 
motivation for the payment method decision.
Previous empirical studies used the market model to 
investigate the impact of takeover on shareholder wealth. 
Therefore, this study will use the same model, the market 
model, to estimate and examine the shareholders wealth 
effect of both acquiring and target firms in the lodging 
industry.
Summary
Previous studies have provided clear evidence that 
shareholders of target firms enjoy the additional wealth
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gain as a result of the takeover proposals. However, for 
acquiring firms, the evidence is inconclusive. Empirical 
findings make it difficult to interpret existing evidence 
and to draw conclusions. Moreover, literature review shows 
that most previous empirical studies focused on multiple 
industries or single non-hospitality industry expect for 
the study conducted by Kwansa (1994) who examined the 
impact of acquisitions on the shareholders of hotels and 
restaurants target firms. The literature review, therefore, 
reveals that there are not enough empirical findings 
regarding the impact of acquisitions on the shareholders in 
the lodging industry. Moreover, Kwansa (1994) only 
concentrated on target firms of hotels and restaurants. As 
a result, there is no evidence on the shareholder wealth 
effect on both the shareholders of acquiring firms in the 
lodging industry and especially no findings for the 
shareholders of both acquiring and target firms of casino 
hotels. This study that will be the first attempts to 
investigate whether the shareholders of both acquiring and 
target firms of non-casino and casino firms earn any 
additional gains from the takeover proposals is needed to 
provide evidence on this matter for the lodging industry.
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The literature review also showed that the studies on 
the shareholders wealth effect used the market model 
developed by Fama (1969) to examine the impact of the 
takeover proposals. Therefore, this study will use the same 
model, the market model, to investigate whether the 
shareholders of both acquiring and target firms of non­
casino and casino hotels.
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CHAPTER 3 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Introduction
This chapter explains the research methodology used in 
this study and consists of four parts : (1) research
objective, (2) sampling and data collection procedures, (3) 
research method, and (4) hypothesis testing.
Research Objective 
The primary research objective of this study is to
investigate the impact of takeovers on shareholder wealth
in the hospitality industry, especially concentrating on 
casino and non-casino hotels by using the market model. 
Since there are few empirical studies in the hospitality 
industry related to this subject, this investigation
provides insight into the takeovers in the hospitality
industry. More specifically, no empirical studies have 
focused on the impact of takeovers in the casino industry.
42
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This study is therefore the first empirical study of 
the impact of takeovers in the casino industry. The 
objective will be achieved by collecting relevant data on 
both acquiring and target firms in the casino and lodging 
industry, interpreting the collected data, and analyzing 
results using the research method that will be described 
later in this chapter. The results and findings of the 
study will be presented in Chapter 4.
Sampling and Data Collection Procedures 
This study examines a sample of public announcements 
of takeover proposals in the lodging industry covering the 
period from 1990 through 1999. The sample of casino and 
non-casino hotel firms used for this study was drawn from 
the lodging and casino industry, defined by either the 
firm's two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 
code (70 for the lodging industry and 79 for the casino 
industry), or by its five-digit North American Industry 
Classification System (NAICS) code (72111 for non-casino 
hotels and motels and 72112 for casino hotels). To narrow 
the range of the sample, non-casino hotels were limited to 
those with 7011 SIC codes or 72111 NAICS codes, and casino
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hotels were limited to those with 7990 primary SIC codes 
and 7011 secondary SIC codes, or 72112 NAICS codes.
The choice of the lodging industry was made due to the 
author's personal interest in the industry, and the 
increase in the number and value of deals in this industry 
compared to other hospitality sectors. Since the lodging 
industry has reached the mature stage of its business cycle, 
and valuations for lodging companies and capital 
availability are relatively high, a takeover strategy has 
been an effective mechanism for restructuring assets and 
achieving fast market expansion.
Firms with small capitalization were excluded from the 
sample in order to avoid a size effect. Generally firms 
with small capitalization receive higher and positive 
impact of takeovers than those with larger capitalization 
do. Firms with other significant corporate events 
surrounding the announcement date of a takeover proposal 
were also excluded. Such events include an announcement of 
a dividend increase, a chief executive officer (CEO) 
resignation, a common stock repurchase, a new offering of 
securities, and a large new contract. Finally, both casino 
and non-casino hotel firms were required to be publicly 
traded and listed on the New York Stock Exchange and the
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American Stock Exchange (NYSE/AMEX) or on the National 
Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation 
System (NASDAQ).
For this study, the term, "The abnormal return (or 
residuals) for each stock" is defined as the difference 
between the stock return at any time and the expected stock 
return. The expected stock return is measured conditional 
on the realized return on a market index to take account of 
the influence of marketwide events on the returns of 
individual securities (Jensen and Ruback 1983). The price 
of stock is reflected all available information on the 
certain stock and the market at any point in time and are, 
also, evaluated by all available information at any time by 
all investors. That is, the abnormal return is assumed to 
be non-normally distributed around zero. The Term, "the 
daily average abnormal return" is defined as the mean of 
each stock's abnormal return. The term, "the average 
cumulative abnormal returns are also defined as the sum of 
the average abnormal returns over the interval. For this 
study the event interval is t = -2 through t = +2. In this 
study, the daily average abnormal returns and daily 
cumulative abnormal returns are assessed to test the 
statistical significance. If a firm experiences significant
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positive abnormal returns as a result of a takeover 
proposal, the firm earns additional gains from the proposal 
A firm, on the other hand, experiences significant negative 
returns, the firm earns losses from the proposal. To 
measure the abnormal returns of casino and non-casino hotel 
firms in response to each takeover announcement, an initial 
list of 966 stock distributions that took place over the 
period from 1990 through 1999 was identified from 1990-1999 
Mergers & Acquisitions Rosters and Bear Stearns' Gaming 
Intelligence Reports (1998, June 22 - July 6; 2000, May 8 - 
May 22). This period was selected because the increase in 
the value of deals and the number of deals was relatively 
significant compared to previous periods. The announcement 
date of takeover proposals is the date of the first public 
announcement of the offer in the Wall Street Journal (WSJ). 
From the initial sample of 966, transactions were 
eliminated if they did not satisfy the following criteria:
(1) Acquiring and target hotel firms' common 
stock traded on NYSE/AMEX or NASDAQ.
(2) Daily stock returns of acquiring and target
hotel firms were contained in the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) file or 
the CRSP NASDAQ file.
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(3) Stock return data was available for at least 
210 days prior to the takeover announcement.
(4) The date of the first public announcement of 
the takeover proposal and were identifiable.
(5) No other significant corporate events 
regarding the firm were reported in the Wall 
Street Journal (WSJ) index in the two days 
before and after the announcement date.
(6) A deal was valued at $10 million or more.
Major spin-off deals in the lodging industry such as 
the announcement that Hilton Corporation acquired one of 
divisions of Starwood Hotels & Resorts (Caesars World Inc.) 
included as the sample in order to increase the sample size, 
Some firms in the sample were also used more than one time 
with different time frame, at least one and half year 
difference from previous deal to increase the sample size. 
The final sample consisted of 142 takeover proposals with 
57 acquiring non-casino hotel stock portfolios and 30 
acquiring casino hotel stock portfolios, and 30 target non­
casino hotel stock portfolios and 25 target casino hotel 
stock portfolios. Tables 5 and 6 provide the lists of 
sample non-casino and casino hotel firms.
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List of Non-Casino Hotel Firms in Sample,
4 8
Acquiring Firms Target Firms
Amerihost Properties Inc.
Bass PLC.
Bridgestreet Accommodations Inc. 
Bristol Hotel CO.
Capstar Hotel Inc.
Double Tree Hotel Corp.
Equity Inns Inc.
Extended Stay America Inc.
FelCor Lodging Trust Inc.
HFS Inc.
Hilton Hotels Corp.
Hospitality Properties Trust. 
Host Marriott Corp.
Hudson Hotels Corp.
Interstate Hotel Corp.
La Quinta Inns Inc.
Lodgian Inc.
Marriott International Inc.
Meditrust corp.
Motel 6 LP.
Patriot American Hospitality Inc, 
Prime Hospitality Corp.
Promus Hotel Corp.
RFS Hotel Investors Inc.
Sun International Hotel LTD 
Starwood Hotels and Resorts. 
Wyndham Hotel Corp. 
wyndham international. Inc.
Amerihost Properties Inc. 
Bass PLC.
Boca Raton Resort & Club. 
Boykin Lodging Co.
Bristol Hotel Co.
Courtyard Hotels.
Double Tree Hotel Corp. 
Equity Inns Inc.
HFS Inc.
Homestead Village Inc.
Host Marriott Corp. 
Interstate Hotels Corp.
ITT Corp.
La Quinta Motor Inns Inc. 
Marriott Corp.
PHH Corp.
Prime Hospitality Corp. 
Prime Motor Inns Inc.
Promus Hotel Corp.
Red Lion Hotels Inc.
Red Lion Inns.
Renaissance Hotel Group.
RFS Hotel Investor Inc. 
Starwood Hotels and Resorts, 
Studio Plus Hotel Inc. 
United Inns Inc.
Westin Hotels & Resorts. 
Wyndham Hotel Co.
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Table 6.
List of Casino Hotel Firms in Sample.
Acquiring Firms Target Firms
Alliance Gaming Corp.
Ameristar Casinos Inc.
American Wagering Inc.
Anchor Gaming.
Argosy Gaming Co.
Aztar Corp.
Boomtown Inc.
Boyd Gaming Corp.
Caesars World Inc.
Casino America Inc.
Grand Casino Inc.
Harrah's Entertainment Inc. 
Hollywood park Inc.
International Gaming management. 
Mandalay Resort Group.
MGM Grand Inc.
Mirage Resort Inc.
Park Place Entertainment Corp.
Sun International Hotels LTD. 
Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts Inc.
Bally Entertainment Corp.
Boomtown Inc.
Starwood Hotels & Resorts (Caesars 
World Inc.).
Casino Magic Corp.
Caesars New Jersey Inc.
Caesars World Inc.
Grand Casinos Inc.
Grand Gaming Corp.
Griffin Gaming & Entertainment Inc. 
Harrah's Entertainment Inc.
Harvey Casino Resorts.
Hollywood Park Inc.
Lady Luck Gaming Corp.
MGM Grand Inc.
National Gaming Corp.
Players International Inc. 
Primadonna Resorts Inc.
Rio Hotel and Casino Inc.
Showboat Inc.
Station Casinos Inc.
WHG Resort & Casino Inc.
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Research Methodology 
To investigate the stock price reaction to the 
announcements of takeovers, the CRSP daily stock returns 
file was used to measure the average daily abnormal returns 
for each firm in the sample by using the event study 
methodology developed by Fama (1969) , and Brown and Warner 
(1980 and 1985). Event studies in finance measure stock 
performance after subtracting a benchmark return based on 
beta risk (Ocana, Pena, and Robles, 1997).
An important issue in an event study is the choice of 
the event date (Halpem, 1993). Researchers have chosen 
either the first public announcement date of the takeover 
or the actual takeover date, so that uncertainty about 
success or failure of the takeover has been resolved. 
However, it is difficult to identify changes in abnormal 
returns prior to the actual takeover date, because there 
may be many other economic activities that influence the 
returns of the firm between the first public date and the 
actual takeover date. On the other hand, the choice of the 
first public announcement date as the event date allows the 
investigation of any differences in the abnormal returns 
observed among a prior announcement period, an announcement 
period, and a post-effective period. As a result, most
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studies use the first public announcement date as the event 
date. This study, therefore, adopts the first public 
announcement date as the event date.
For each security i, the daily rate of return for 
security i is calculated using the following market model:
where = rate of return of security i over period t, R^^
= rate of return on a value weighted market portfolio over 
period t, and a^, b^ = market model parameter estimates.
The abnormal return for security i is estimated as :
Previous studies conducted by Mandelker (1974) and 
Halpem (1983) reported that abnormal returns for target 
firms are significantly different from zero up to about a 
month before the announcement date of the acquisition 
proposals. Loderer and Mauer (1986) also argued that the 
market model parameter estimates (a^ and b̂ )̂ for acquiring
firms will be biased if the estimation period is confined
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to the period just before the takeover. Consequently, the 
market model parameter estimates (a^ and b^) for each
acquiring and target firm are estimated in this study over 
the period from t=-210 to t=-10 relative to the event day 
(t=0) where the event is the announcement of a takeover 
proposal. The daily abnormal return for each firm is 
calculated over the interval (t=-2 to t=+2), which begins 
two days prior to the announcement date and ends two days 
after the announcement date. The market reaction for the 
non-casino and casino hotel firms is measured for two days ; 
the day a merger announcement is reported in the Wall 
Street Journal (t=0) and the day before (t=-l). It is 
important to note that while day 0 is defined as the date 
of announcement there is reason to believe that the 
accurate date is in fact day 1 for some firms in the sample 
(Dodd, 1980). That is, even though day zero is the date the 
acquisition announcement is published in the Wall Street 
Journal, some of announcements information are released to 
the press during trading hours the day before and it is 
expected in the marked prices of that day (day -1).
For a sample of N securities, an average abnormal 
return (AR^) for each day is calculated by:
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ARj. = 1/N
where N = number of securities in a sample and t indexes 
days in event time. The average abnormal returns are summed 
over various intervals (t=-2 to t=+2) to obtain cumulative 
average abnormal returns (CAR^) over the interval of each
day.
If there are no abnormal events that make stock price 
movement unusual surrounding the event day, the expected 
values of average abnormal returns (AR^) and cumulative
average abnormal returns (CAR^) are zero. Therefore,
significant deviations from zero indicate the financial 
market's responses to the announcement of takeover 
proposals.
Hypothesis Testing 
A t-test is used to test the statistical significance 
of average abnormal returns (AR^) and cumulative average
abnormal returns (CAR^) of each sample over the interval
(t=-2 to t=+2) to see whether a takeover generates 
shareholder wealth for both acquiring and target hotel 
firms. If there is no unusual price movement around the
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announcement date of takeover proposals, average abnormal 
returns (AR^) and cumulative average abnormal returns
(CARj.) are expected to fluctuate randomly. Therefore,
significant positive or negative average abnormal returns 
from zero indicate the financial market's responses to the 
takeover announcement.
The following null hypotheses are tested to determine 
whether the announcement of takeover proposals and the 
method of payment that is used to pay for a takeover have a 
significant impact on shareholder wealth in the lodging 
industry.
Null hypotheses :
Null hypothesis 1: There is no significant difference 
in the size of additional shareholder wealth gained by 
shareholders of acquiring firms in the event of a takeover.
Null hypothesis 2: There is no significant difference 
in the size of additional shareholder wealth gained by 
shareholders of target firms in the event of a takeover.
Null hypothesis 3 : There is no significant difference 
between the size of abnormal returns to acquiring firms of 
non-casino hotels compared to the size of abnormal returns 
to acquiring firms of casino hotels.
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Null hypothesis 4: There is no significant difference 
between the size of abnormal returns to target firms of 
non-casino hotels compared to the size of abnormal returns 
to target firms of casino hotels.
Summary
The primary objective of this study is to answer the 
unanswered question of whether the shareholders of 
acquiring firms and target firms in the lodging industry 
experienced any additional wealth as a result of the 
takeover proposals. To do so this study used daily stock 
returns of a sample of 87 acquiring firm stock portfolios 
and 57 target firm portfolios, and used the market model 
developed by Fama (1969) to estimate abnormal returns and 
cumulative abnormal returns of a firm. Using the abnormal 
returns and cumulative abnormal returns the t-test was 
conducted to test four null hypotheses. The results of the 
tests of the null hypotheses will be presented and 
discussed in chapter 4.
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RESULTS AND FINDINGS
In chapter 3, the methodology and the data collection 
procedure were discussed. In chapter 4, the description of 
the test results is presented as follows:
1. The results of data analysis in acquiring firms.
2. The results of data analysis in target firms.
3. The results of differences between acquiring firms 
of non-casino hotels and acquiring firms of casino 
hotels.
4. The results of differences between target firms of 
non-casino hotels and target firms of casino hotels
Results of Tests of Acquiring Firm
The issue investigated in this section is whether 
shareholders of acquiring firms earn any wealth gains as a 
result of takeover announcements. Also, if shareholders of 
acquiring firms experience additional gains, this section
56
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investigates the difference in the size of the abnormal 
returns between non-casino hotel and casino hotel firms 
This section tests the following two null hypotheses:
Null hypothesis 1: There is no significant difference 
in the size of additional shareholder wealth gained by 
shareholders of acquiring firms in the event of a takeover.
Null hypothesis 3 : There is no significant difference 
between the size of abnormal returns to acquiring firms of 
non-casino hotels compared to the size of abnormal returns 
to acquiring firms of casino hotels.
Table 7 shows the average abnormal stock returns for 
acquiring firms for the two day before and after first 
public announcement (day zero). As shown in Table 7, 
announcement of acquisition proposals have a positive 
effect on acquiring firms. The daily abnormal return on the 
announcement day is 1.01 percent, which is significantly 
different from zero at the .01 level (t=3.27). Unlike the 
announcement day abnormal returns, pre-announcement days 
(t=-2 to t=-l) and post-announcement days (t=+l to t=+2) 
abnormal returns are less than 1 percent each day, which is 
not significantly different from zero.
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Table 7.
Daily Average Abnormal Returns for Acquiring Firms.
Event Day AR(%) t-statistic
-2 0.65 2.11
-1 0.61 1.96
0 1.01* 3 .27
+1 -0 .04 -0.15
+2 -0 .17 -0 . 54
*Significant at the .01 level 
AR = Daily Abnormal Return
Table 8 provides daily cumulative average returns for 
the event period, t=-2 to t=+2. Also Table 8 shows two-day 
announcement period cumulative daily average returns 
measured from day -1 through 0. Two days are necessary 
since takeover events never appear in the Wall Street 
Journal until the day after they are announced (Asquith et 
al., 1983). For example, the proper event date is t=-l when 
takeover announcement occurs before the stock market closes. 
Also, the proper event day is t=0 when the announcement is 
released to public after the stock market closes. Therefore, 
it follows that market reactions to the announcement are 
represented by the two-day abnormal returns at day -1 and 0.
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Table 8.
Daily Cumulative Average Returns for Acquiring Firms.
Event Day CAR(%) t-statistic
-2 to +2 2.06* 2 .98
-1 to 0 1.61* 3 .69
*Significant at the .01 level
CAR = Daily Cumulative Abnormal Return
In the two-day (t=-l to t=0) and five-day (t=-2 to 
t=+2) announcement period, cumulative abnormal returns are 
1.61 and 2.06 percent respectively, which is significantly 
different from zero at the .01 level of significance (
to t=0 = 3.69 and t^^_^ ^=+2 = 2.98). Therefore null
hypothesis 1 is rejected. Based on the results obtained 
from the sample, it is concluded that, on average, 
shareholders of acquiring firms experience significant 
gains from the proposal.
Table 9 and 10 provide the daily average abnormal 
returns and the daily average cumulative abnormal returns 
for each sub-group of acquiring firms of non-casino and 
casino hotels.
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Table 9.
Average Abnormal Returns for Acquiring Firms of Non-Casino 
and Casino Hotels.
Event Day Non-Casino Hotels Casino Hotels
AR(%) t-statistic AR(%) t-statistic
-2 0.53 2.01 0.69 1.03
-1 -0 .037 -0 .12 1.8* 2.72
0 0 .41 1.29 2.2* 3.22
+1 0 .19 0.61 -0.49 -0 .74
+ 2 0.036 0.11 -0.55 -0 .82
*Signifleant at the .0]. level
AR = Daily Abnormal Return 
Table 10.
Daily Cumulative Average Returns for Acquiring Firms of 
Non-Casino and Casino Hotels.
Event Day Non-Casino Hotels Casino Hotels
CAR(%) t-statistic CAR(%) t-statistic
-2 Co +2 0 .37 0.83 3 .98* 4.20
-1 Co 0 1.22 1.75 3 .63* 2 .42
"Significant at the 0.01 level 
CAR = Daily Cumulative Abnormal Return
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The results on acquiring firms of non-casino hotel 
firms presented in Table 9 and 10 indicate that 
shareholders of acquiring firms of non-casino hotels 
experience, on average, "normal" rate of return.
Specifically, the announcement day (t=0) abnormal return is 
0.41 percent, which is statistically insignificant at 
the .01 level of significance (t=l.29). In addition, the 
two-day (t=-l to t=0) announcement period and the entire 
event period (t=-2 to t=+2) cumulative abnormal return are 
1.22 and 0.37 percent, respectively, which is also 
statistically insignificant = 1.75 and t^_ ^
to t=+2 ■ 0-83, respectively).
In contrast to the acquiring firms of non-casino 
hotels, the results on the acquiring firms of casino hotels 
presented in Table 9 and 10 indicate that shareholders of 
acquiring firms of casino hotels have positive abnormal 
returns, 2.2 percent on the announcement date, which is 
significantly different from zero at the .01 level (t=3.22). 
In addition, for the two-day (t=-l to t=0) announcement 
period and the entire event period (t=-2 to t=0), the 
cumulative abnormal returns to shareholders of acquiring 
firms of casino-hotels are 3.63 and 3.98 percent, 
respectively, which is statistically significant at the .01
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level c=0 = 2.42 and c ;  = 4.20
respectively).
To facilitate the comparison of the results between 
acquiring firms of non-casino hotels and acquiring firms of 
casino hotels, two-day (t=-l to t=0) announcement period 
the cumulative abnormal returns are compared. Over the two- 
day announcement period, the mean difference of cumulative 
abnormal returns between two groups is -2.41 percent and 
the difference is significant at the .01 level (t=5.01).
The results show that acquiring firms of non-casino hotels 
and acquiring firms of casino hotels are evaluated 
differently and acquiring firms of casino hotel are more 
favored by the investors at the two-day announcement period 
of acquisition proposals. Based on the results hypothesis 3 
is rejected.
Results of Tests of Target Firm 
In this section, a sample of target firms is analyzed 
to determine whether there are wealth gains accruing to the 
shareholders of target firms from the takeover 
announcements. If there are the wealth gains, the wealth 
gains are also analyzed to determine the difference in the 
size of abnormal returns between the non-casino hotels and
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casino hotels. The following two null hypotheses are tested 
to show the results.
Null hypothesis 2: There is no significant difference 
in the size of additional shareholder wealth gained by 
shareholders of target firms in the event of a takeover.
Null hypothesis 4: There is no significant difference 
between the size of abnormal returns to target firms of 
non-casino hotels compared to the size of abnormal returns 
to target firms of casino hotels.
Table 11 presents average abnormal returns for target 
firms for each day in the event period, +2 through —2 . The 
results indicate that announcements of the acquisition 
proposals have a positive effect on common stock prices of 
target firms.
The abnormal return on the day prior to the first 
announcement of the proposal is 5.14 percent, which is 
significantly different from zero at the .01 level 
( t=ll. 02 ) . The abnormal return on the announcement day 
(t=0) is 5.12 percent, which is also significantly 
different from zero at the .01 level (t=10.9). Moreover, 
the two-day (t=-l to t=0) and the entire event period (t=-2 
to t=+2) shown in Table 12 are 10.27 and 11.45 percent.
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respectively, which is significant at the .01 level (t^_ 
to t=0 = 15.56 and t^^_2 &=+2 =10*97, respectively).
Table 11.
Daily Average Abnormal Returns for Target Firms.
Event Day AR(%) t-statistic
-2 0.72 1.63
-1 5.14* 11.02
0 5.12* 10.9
+1 0.73 1.55
+ 2 -0.31 -0.66
*Significant at the .01 level
AR = Daily Abnormal Return
The results show that shareholders of target firms 
earn significant positive gains from the acquisition 
proposal. Therefore hypothesis 2 is rejected. A rejection 
of this null hypothesis supports the idea that the 
shareholders of target firms earn significant additional 
wealth gains around the takeover announcement date.
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Table 12.
Cumulative Daily Average Returns for Target Firms
Event Day C A R ( % ) t-statistic
+2 to -2 11.45* 10.97
-1 to 0 10 .27* 15.55
♦Significant at the .01 level
CAR = Daily Cumulative Abnormal Return
Table 13 and 14 show results for the behavior of the 
average daily and cumulative abnormal returns of target 
firms of non-casino hotels and casino hotels. As shown in 
Table 13 and 14 both target firms of non-casino and casino 
hotels experience significant positive abnormal returns on 
the two-day announcement period, 5.2 percent (t=6.15) and 
16.1 percent (t=10.31), respectively, and on the entire 
event period, 6.39 percent (t=4.78) and 17.47 percent 
(t=15.02), respectively. Target firms of casino hotels, 
however, earn higher abnormal returns than those of non­
casino hotels. The comparison of two-day announcement 
period cumulative between two group shows that there is 
significant difference from zero at the .01 level (t=-3.28) 
Therefore, hypothesis 4 is rejected.
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Table 13.
Average Daily Abnormal Returns for Target Firms of Non- 
Casino Hotels and Casino Hotels.
Event Day Non-Casino Hotels Casino Hotels
AR(%) t-statistic AR(%)
t-
statistic
-2 0.38 0 .64 1.24 1.64
-1 2.53* 4.23 8.23* 10.87
0 2.67* 4.46 7.87* 10.87
+ 1 1.57* 2.63 -0.11 -0.15
+ 2 -0 .76 -1.27 0.24 0.31
♦Significant at the 0.01 level 
AR = Daily Abnormal Return
Table 14 .
Cumulative Daily Average Returns for Target Firms of Non- 
Casino Hotels and Casino Hotels.
Event Day Non-Casino Hotels Casino Hotels
CAR(%) t-statistic CAR(%)
t-
statistic
-2 to -1-2 6.39* 4.78 17.47* 15 .02
-1 to 0 5.2* 6.15 16.1* 10 .31
♦Significant at the 0.01 level
CAR = Daily Cumulative Abnormal Return
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The Results of the Cross-Sectional Analysis 
This study included the announcements of spin-off in 
order to increase the sample size. In this section, cross- 
section regression was used to investigate whether the 
abnormal returns created by spin-off announcements are 
significantly different from the abnormal returns created 
by takeover announcements. Table 15 reports the results of 
the regression test of both acquiring firms and target 
firms. The dependent variable is the two-day(t=-l to t=l) 
cumulative abnormal returns. For the independent variable, 
the dummy variable (dummy = 0 for takeover proposal and 
dummy = 1 for spin-off proposal) is usf»d.
Table 15.
The Results of the Regression Test for Acquiring Firms and 
Target Firms : t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
Acquiring Firms Target Firms
Intercept .019 (1.79) .101 (2.82)*
Dummy = 1 for 
spin-off proposal
.00031 (.209) .0253 (.497)
Adjusted R2 .011 .014
F- statistic .43 .247
♦Significant at the .01 level
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The result shown in Table 15 indicates that the 
abnormal returns of spin-off used in the study are not 
significantly different from the abnormal returns of 
takeover. The coefficient of spin-off dummy shows that 
abnormal returns of spin-off are positively correlated with 
abnormal returns of takeover, which is statistically 
insignificant. The results in this section are different 
from the results of Allan et al. (1995)'s study indicating 
that abnormal returns of spin-off announcement period are 
negatively and significantly correlated with abnormal 
returns of acquisition announcement period.
Summary
Results of the study confirm previous well-documented 
results (i.e. Bradley, et al., (1983), and Jensen and 
Ruback (1983)) that shareholders of target firms 
experienced positive additional wealth gain around the take 
over announcement. In contrast to the previous findings for 
shareholders of target firms, the previous findings for 
shareholders of acquiring firms are ambiguous. For the 
shareholder of acquiring firms, however, the findings are 
in line with Mandelker (1974) , Dodd and Ruback (1977) ,
Bradley(1980), and Bradley et al., (1983) who report a
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positive additional wealth gain around the takeover 
announcement.
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CHAPTER 5
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Summary and Conclusions 
The primary purpose of the study was to investigate 
shareholder wealth effects in the lodging industry. Since 
previous empirical studies that investigated shareholder 
wealth effects have focused on either multiple industries 
or single non-hospitality industry, this study originated 
from the question of whether shareholders in the lodging 
industry earn significant additional wealth as a result of 
mergers and acquisitions. Also, the literature review 
indicated that there are significant additional wealth 
gains accruing to the shareholders of target firms around 
the takeover announcement date. For the shareholders of 
acquiring firms, on the other hands, the evidence was 
ambiguous, and therefore, difficult to interpret existing 
evidence and draw conclusions.
70
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In response to the question, a sample of 87 stock 
portfolios of acquiring firms and 55 stock portfolios of 
target firms were selected over the period from 1990 
through 1999 to estimate and examine abnormal returns and 
the cumulative abnormal returns. This period was selected 
because the increase in the value of takeover deals and the 
number of takeover deals were relatively significant 
compared to previous periods.
The results of the study show that overall acquiring 
firm shareholders do earn significant positive abnormal 
returns on the announcement day, as well as significant 
positive cumulative abnormal returns around the takeover 
announcement (t=-2 through t=+2).
For non-casino acquiring firms, shareholders earn, on 
average, normal rate of return. For casino acquiring firms, 
on the other hands, shareholders earn positive additional 
wealth. The difference between two-day (t=-l to t=0) 
cumulative abnormal returns for non-casino hotels and two- 
day cumulative abnormal returns for casino hotels is 
significant at the .01 level.
Shareholders of target firms receive significant 
positive additional gains created as a result of takeover 
announcements. This result confirms previous well-
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documented results (i.e. Bradley, et al. (1983),and Jensen 
and Ruback (1983)). Non-casino hotel firms earn 6.39 
percent cumulative abnormal returns over the event period. 
Casino hotel firms, on the other hands, earn 17.49 percent 
cumulative abnormal returns, which is about three times 
larger than non-casino hotel firms. The difference between 
the cumulative abnormal returns for non-casino hotel firms 
and the cumulative abnormal returns for casino hotel firms 
is also significant at the .01 level. One explanation for 
these results is that there are few hotels that can acquire 
other firms in the lodging industry. That is, there is less 
likelihood of the emergence of multiple bidders for a 
target firm. Michel and Shaked (1988), Franks, Harris, and 
Mayer (1988), and Lefanowicz and Robinson (2000) found 
evidence that multiple bidder acquisitions result in higher 
acqpiisition returns to target firms. In other words, the 
less likelihood of the emergence of multiple bidders, the 
more likelihood of the increase of returns to acquiring 
firms since the acquiring firms can acquire the target at a 
lower price. In the casino hotel sector there are fewer 
firms that can take over other firms compared to the non­
casino hotel sector. That is, there is less likelihood of 
the emergence of multiple bidders in the casino hotel 
sector. Shareholders of acquiring firms of casino hotel.
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therefore, earned positive additional gains from the 
takeover announcements. Shareholders of acquiring firms of 
non-casino firms, on the other hands, experienced "normal" 
return. Another reason that may explain the results is 
industry-specific management expertise. Lang, Stultz, and 
Walking (1989), and Servaes (1991) suggested Tobin's q is 
an important determinant of the size of abnormal returns 
around takeover announcements. High q firms are associated 
with having more intangible assets, such as industry- 
specific management expertise, than are lower q firms. They 
found that cumulative abnormal returns of acquiring firms 
and target firms are larger when the acquiring firm is a 
high q firm and the target firm is a low q firm. That is, 
the market expects more value to be created when a firm 
with good management expertise takes over a firm with poor 
management expertise. The difference in the size of 
abnormal returns between non-casino hotel and casino hotel 
firms may be explained by the same reasons. The casino 
industry is generally considered to have higher barriers 
for entering into the industry. The barriers include state 
agencies' regulations, intensively competitive markets, 
initial high capital requirements, long development 
timelines, and limitations of good geographic locations 
(Yuh, 1999). Those barriers make firms in the non-casino
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industry difficult to enter a takeover deal for a casino 
hotel. A few firms with good management expertise on the 
casino industry, therefore, can take over a casino hotel 
firm. As a result there is less possibility for the 
emergence of multiple acquirers. That is, an acquirer has 
less competition for the takeover and the acquirer requires 
less payment for the takeover. For the casino target firm, 
the market react more positively to the takeover because of 
the acquiring firm' management expertise.
Little empirical work has been done to investigate the 
shareholder wealth effects in the lodging industry. Kwansa 
(1994) provided evidence that shareholders of target hotel 
earned significant abnormal returns prior and after 3 0 day 
of the announcement day. The findings of this study are 
consistent with the findings of Kwansa. Also this study 
estimates and examines not only stock returns for target 
hotel firms but also stock returns for acquiring hotel 
firms. Moreover, this study is the first attempt focusing 
on two different characteristic hotels, non-casino hotels 
and casino hotels. The findings of this study introduce and 
confirm the unanswered question of whether shareholders of 
both acquiring firms and target firms in the lodging 
industry earn significant additional wealth created as a 
result of takeover proposals.
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Recommendations of Future Study 
This study has attempted to introduce and answer the 
question of whether shareholders of both acquiring firms 
and target firms earn additional benefits created as a 
result of takeover proposals. The findings in this study 
have provided some of evidences and answers, but have also 
introduced some other takeover-related questions. The 
following is a list of recommendations for future research
questions that need to be investigated further :
(1) Future research expand test period at least 20
years to increase a sample size. Even though this 
study used ten year period (1990 to 1999), the 
study could obtain 142 stock portfolios which is 
relatively small compared to previous empirical 
studies. One explanation is that many of hotel 
firms, especially casino hotels, are not publicly 
traded companies. Moreover, due to relatively 
small sample size, this study failed to provide
an answer to the question of whether there will
be significant difference in the size of 
additional wealth created in terms of use in 
different payment methods, such as cash offer, 
stock exchange offer, or mixed offer.
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(2) This study only estimated and examined 
shareholder wealth effects around the 
announcement period. Future research should 
attempt to investigate not only short-term 
shareholder benefit created from around 
announcement date, but also long-term shareholder 
benefit created over three year period from the 
announcement date to demonstrate the post­
acquisition returns in the context of shareholder 
wealth gains from takeover activities. Future 
research also investigates the difference in 
shareholder wealth gains between the combined 
pre-acquisition period and the combined post­
acquisition period.
Recommendations for future study mentioned here will 
hopefully provide a guideline and other issues for future 
investigation into shareholder wealth effects in takeovers.
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